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Assessing Participation in the Milk Income Loss Contract Program 
and its Impact on Milk Production 
 
Abstract 
The MILC program, a counter-cyclical income support program, was designed to provide price 
support to dairy farmers. Since the inception of the MILC program it has been argued that the 
program is inefficient and rewards inefficiency by keeping high cost, small dairy farms in 
business. Large dairy producers have expressed concerns that the MILC payments have 
negatively affected their farming income. Using farm-level, ARMS data from 2005, this study 
investigated the factors that affect farmer’s decision to participate in MILC program and if 
participation in MILC has an impact on milk production. The results show that participation in 
MILC program is positively correlated with farmer’s educational attainment, organic 
certification subsidy, milk price, off-farm work by spouses, and financial record keeping. 
Further, medium sized dairy farms are more likely to participate in MILC program. Finally, 
results indicate that participation in MILC program has a positive impact on milk production.  
 
Keywords: dairy farms, agricultural policy, Milk Income Loss Contract Program, two-step 
probit estimation   
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Assessing Participation in the Milk Income Loss Contract Program 
and its Impact on Milk Production 
 
During the 20
th century, financial stress in the dairy industry has led to the creation and 
dismantling of various dairy programs (Shields, 2010). The most prominent dairy policy 
instrument, instituted in the early 1930’s, has been the Dairy Price Support Program (DPSP). 
Under the DPSP, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stands ready to purchase excess 
nonfat dry milk, butter, and cheese to support market prices of milk.
2  The 1996 Farm bill 
provided decoupled payments to dairy farmers. Billions of dollars were spent to make up for low 
prices; however, these payments only caused low market prices for milk to persist. The 2002 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (2002 Farm Bill) initiated the counter-cyclical dairy 
income support program known as Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program.  The MILC 
program was designed to provide price support to dairy farmers when milk prices fell below a 
target level for the Boston Federal Milk Marketing Order Class I price.  In order to receive 
program payments, a dairy farmer must earn a nonfarm, adjusted gross income less than 
$500,000. Payments are only eligible for up to 2.985 million pounds of milk produced within the 
fiscal year.
3  Unless they otherwise fail to enroll in the program, dairy farmers receive MILC 
payments if the market price of milk falls below the target level.  From inception through 2010, 
the program has made payments of about $3.5 billion to U.S. dairy farmers (figure 1). 
The MILC program is unique in its design by imposing a limit on milk eligible for 
payment during a fiscal year (Oct-Sept). It has been argued that given a chance to participate in 
federal programs like MILC almost every dairy producer will participate. However, data from 
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3 This limit was about 2.4 million pounds until the 2008 Farm Bill, when the MILC program was renewed with new 
production limit.  3 
 
the 2005 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS)
4 shows that 58 percent of the 
producers—with an average of 7,815,427 pounds of milk production—did not participate in the 
MILC program. Since the inception of the MILC program it has been argued that the program is 
inefficient and rewards inefficiency by keeping high cost, small dairy farms in business. Large 
dairy producers have expressed concerns that the MILC payments have negatively affected their 
farming income. The MILC program has also been criticized for extending the length of low 
price periods and shifting the responsibilities of supply adjustment to large dairy farmers.  
With more than half of dairy operations not participating in MILC program (ARMS, 
2005) and average production of over two times the production limit for payments, some curious 
possibilities arise.  It is possible that farms above the threshold were waiting until later in the 
fiscal year to enroll in the program and prices never fell below the target level, thereby leaving 
them without MILC payments for the year. Alternatively, did large dairy farms never bothered to 
apply for MILC program in the first place? This study investigates these questions further by (1) 
evaluating the factors that affect dairy farmers’ decision to enroll in MILC program and (2) 
determining whether participation in MILC has an impact on milk production.    
Background 
 
Since its inception in 2002, the MILC program has received relatively less attention in the 
academic literature. There are several reasons for the paucity of research in this area. First, there 
is scarce data available to research this issue. The second reason is the regional concentration of 
the dairy industry to Midwest states like Minnesota and Wisconsin, Northeast States like 
Vermont, New York, and Pennsylvania, and large dairy farms in California. Finally, the dairy 
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industry is undergoing significant structural changes—under cost cutting endeavors—faced by 
low milk prices.
5   
  In a very early stage of the MILC program, Gould and Hackney (2003) concluded that, 
given the seasonality in milk prices and production cap, large dairy farms may time annual 
enrollment in MILC so as to maximize expected level of MILC payments. Jesse (2005) criticizes 
the configuration of the MILC program and indicated that MILC program is detrimental to the 
dairy industry in the long run. Herndon and Davis (2005) examined the impact of MILC program 
on milk production levels in twenty states. Using monthly data from 1995-2004 and Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) the authors analyzed the impact on implementation of MILC—through a 
dummy variable approach—on aggregate milk production. Herndon and Davis (2005) found a 
positive and significant relationship between production levels and MILC dummies for only four 
states (Indiana, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas).
6   
  In 2007 Bryant, Outlaw, and Anderson investigated the impact of MILC on aggregate 
production. The authors decomposed aggregate production into the dairy size (by number of 
cows) and milk production per cow. Using bi-annual data from 1996-2006 and a dynamic 
framework the authors found no significant relationship between MILC and size of dairy or milk 
production per cow. While few studies have investigated the impact of the MILC program on 
production, there are several studies that have investigated two major components of federal 
dairy policy—namely marketing orders and price supports.  For example, Helmberger and Chen 
(1994) found that the federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs) raise fluid prices substantially and 
lower product prices.  The authors also found that the DPSP raises blend prices significantly. On 
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the other hand, Cox and Chavas (2001) analyzed various alternative dairy policy scenarios. The 
authors found that eliminating FMMOs would result in lower blend milk prices, sharply lower 
fluid milk prices and higher product prices.  
  Chavas and Kim (2004) conclude that market liberalization has been associated with a 
large increase in price volatility. However, the authors found that DSPS program was effective in 
reducing short-run price volatility to some extent over January 1980-June 2002 time period. 
Further, Chavas and Kim (2004) conclude that the effect of DSPS on price volatility disappears 
in the long-run. Finally, the authors conclude that government policy can have long-term effects 
on market prices even with limited government involvement—when support prices are 
nonbinding.  
Finally, there are a couple of studies in the dairy sector that have investigated the impact 
of supply control on supply of milk and other milk products. For example, Kaiser, Streeter, and 
Liu (1988) investigated the impact of replacing DSPS with mandatory supply controls. They 
concluded that supply control would result in significant welfare transfers from consumers to 
producers. Dixon, Susanto, and Berry (1991) examined the effects of the Milk Diversion 
Program (output reduction) and Dairy Termination Program (herd buyouts) on milk production. 
The authors concluded that the reduction in output were very small and short-lived. Finally, 
Bausell, Belsley, and Smith (1992) investigated the impact of the Milk Diversion Program 
(output reduction) and Dairy Termination Program (herd buyouts) on government dairy product 
surpluses. The authors concluded that reduced support prices would help lower government dairy 
product surpluses.  
Unlike previous research, this study investigates the factors that affect farmer’s decision 
to participate in the MILC program and to assess the impact of participation in MILC on total 6 
 
milk production. Specifically, we model the decision to participate in the program and milk 
production jointly using two-step probit least squares. Most notable, we find that a higher 
probability of enrolling in the MILC program is correlated with greater milk production on the 
farm. Perhaps this indicates a self-perpetuating problem created by the MILC program. The 
program payments may result in an increased supply of milk, downward pressure on prices, and 
thereby a greater likelihood of MILC payments.  
Data 
 
Data were extracted from the Dairy Production Practices and Costs and Returns Report 
(Agricultural Resource Management Survey Phase II, commonly referred to as ARMS). 
Observations were collected using a survey jointly administered by the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service and the Economic Research Service of the USDA for dairy production during 
calendar year 2005. The ARMS data includes detailed financial information, such as farm 
income and expenses, as well as farm and operator characteristics. The specific survey was taken 
from targeted dairy operations in twenty-four states that account for more than 90% of national 
milk production and cover all major production areas. It elicited detailed information about the 
production practices on the farm and costs of milk production.  
We first limited our sample to those farms that produce dairy products as the primary 
farm practice and are excluded farms with zero milk production in 2005. After accounting for 
non-response and missing data, information on 1,732 farms are used for the analysis. Drawing on 
previous studies of dairy production (e.g., Abdulai and Tietje, 2007; Balcombe et al., 2006; 
Bravo-Ureta et al., 2007; Cabrera et al., 2010; Haese et al., 2009; Kompas and Che, 2006; 
Lawson et al., 2004; Nehring et al., 2009; Tauer and Mishra, 2006), several variables 
representing the inputs and output of dairy production, socio-demographic characteristics of the 7 
 
farm operator, farm practice, and participation in the MILC program are specified (Table 1). 
Milk production (     ) in pounds is defined as the production output and four other production 
inputs are also specified. The variable       is defined as the number of adult cows in the herd. 
The variable             is the capital expense reported by the dairy farm operator,           is 
the cost of hired labor,            is the cost of taxes and insurance, and          is the cost of 
feed (all in US $). Squared terms for these input costs are also included in the empirical model to 
test for non-linear relationships between cost and production. Participation in the MILC program 
is represented by the dummy variable MILC. We also include variables for farm size (Small, 
Medium, Large) as defined by herd size. In order to assess the impact of unobserved regional 
factors affecting participation in MILC and milk production we include regional location dummy 
variables in the model. We use the five regional classifications defined by NASS (Atlantic, 
Western, Midwest, Plains, and South).  
  We have included age of the operator (Op_Age), operator off-farm wage income 
(Off_Income_Op), spouse off-farm wage income (Off_ Income_Sp), and dummy variables for 
operator education as some of the demographic variables affecting participation in MILC 
program and quantity of milk produced. Op_Educ_C represents farmers with college education 
and beyond, Op_Educ_H represents high school education and some college, and Op_Educ_B 
represents farmers with less than a high school education (used as the base group). Other 
independent variables reflecting farm management of milk production are also included. A count 
variable representing milking frequency (M_Freq) is defined along with dummies for 
computerized milking system (C_Milking), a dummy variable for farms keeping financial 
records (Record), a dummy variable for farms with milking units that have automatic takeoffs 
(M_Auto), a dummy variable for Internet access (Internet), a dummy variable for farms that are 8 
 
organic (Organic), and a dummy variable indicating whether the farm is eligible for MILC 
Payments (Eligible). Table 1 provides definition of variables and descriptive statistics for all the 




As described by Maddala (1983) and Keshk (2003), this research utilizes two-stage probit least 
squares. This method allows for a continuous and dichotomous variable to be simultaneously 
determined. In our case, this applies to the production decisions of dairy farmers and their 
participation decision with regards to the MILC program. For example, farmers enrolling in the 
MILC program may decrease production to remain under the production threshold. 
Alternatively, farmers may produce greater amounts of milk after entering the program due to 
decreased production risks and because the effective milk price is above market levels. Farmers 
with lower production levels are expected to place a greater value on MILC payments. 
Simultaneously, farmers that produce greater amounts of milk may be less likely to enter the 
program. The threshold level of milk production under the program may be a small percentage of 
their total output; therefore, the revenue generated from the MILC program may not be enough 
to divert the operator’s attention from milk production and sales process. Regardless of the signs 
of the endogenous variables, it is reasonable that the productive capacity and decision to enroll in 
the program are determined jointly.  
  Following Keshk (2003), we can describe the production and participation equations with 
the following: 
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              (2) 9 
 
In equations (1) and (2),   is a continuous, endogenous variable that represents the total 
production of milk from a dairy farm, and   
  is a dichotomous, endogenous variable that takes a 
value of 1 when dairy farmers participate in the MILC program and 0 otherwise.    and    are 
parameters for the endogenous regressors.    and    are vectors of exogenous, explanatory 
variables, and   
  and   
  are the respective vectors of parameters.  
In our model,                   
          
     
                                                                                
and                                                                         
                                               where i=Labor, Tax & Insurance, Feed, 
and Capital and k= Atlantic, Western, Midwest, and Plains. The stochastic error term for each 
equation is represented by    and   .  
  The structural equations (3 & 4) can be re-written to account for   
  being unobserved. 
First, divide both sides of equation (2) by the variance (    of   
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   and the structural equations can be written as follows: 
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A two-step estimation process is then used to estimate these equations. Broadly, predicted values 
for each of the endogenous variable will be estimated from each model, these values will then be 
used as a proxy for the endogenous variables in the structural equations, and finally corrected 
standard errors are calculated for hypothesis testing. 10 
 
  Specifically, in the first stage all of the exogenous variables (Х) in the model will be used 
to estimate predicted values for the endogenous variables (denoted by   ̂  and   ̂ 
  ). The vector of 
parameters in the following equations is denoted by    and   . 
       
           →   ̂ =   ̂    (6) 
  
       
          →   ̂ 
  =   ̂    (7) 
The parameters values for equation (6) are estimated via OLS regression while equation (7) is 
estimated using a probit model. The structural equations can then be re-written incorporating 
these predicted values. 
         ̂ 
       
           (8) 
  
         ̂      
              (9) 
The second stage of the procedure then occurs when equation (8) is estimated via OLS and 
equation (9) is estimated using probit. Notice the absence of the variance term in these structural 
equations relative to the equations (4) and (5). We must now correct the standard errors to 
account for our using predicted values rather than actual values of    and   
   in the second stage 
regression. From Maddala (1983) and Keshk (2003) the following terms are defined: 
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Using the probit model results in normalization of    to one. The corrected variance-covariance 
matrix of    and   are then calculated:  
    ̂                                                           (17) 
    ̂           
                
           
            
         
        (18) 
This entire two-step procedure was easily implemented using the CDSIMEQ command created 




Table 2 provides the marginal effects estimated for the production and participation equations. 
First, the results of interest are the endogenous variables   ̂     and    ̂     . Only the predicted 
probability of enrolling in the MILC program was found significant. In fact, we find that a 
marginal increase in the probability of enrolling in the MILC program results in increased levels 
of milk production. While this variable was significant at the 10% level, nonetheless it does not 
diminish the fact that participation in MILC program increases milk production. This result lends 
support to the criticism that the MILC program extends the periods of low prices. Indeed if 
farmers who are more likely to enroll in the MILC program produce more milk, then there may 
be an excess supply of fluid milk being produced. This would result in a downward pressure on 
prices and increase the probability of future MILC payments occurring. An alternative 
explanation may also be provided by the risk mitigation benefits of the MILC program. Perhaps 
the MILC program provides farmers the necessary income stability required to move to the 
higher levels of production needed to satisfy consumer demanded for dairy products. In which 
case there would be less downward pressure on prices and the self-perpetuating cycle described 
previously would not occur.  12 
 
We included variables in the MILC participation equation for operator and spouse off-
farm labor income, the price of milk, and an interaction variable indicating whether the farmer 
was below both thresholds. The marginal effects for spouse off-farm income (4.33E-06) and the 
price of milk (-0.034) were found significant. We found that farms with spouses earning greater 
levels of off-farm income were more likely to participate in the MILC program. One explanation 
for this may be farmer’s preference for income stability. Those farm households working greater 
hours off-farm have been shown to have lower income volatility (Mishra and Goodwin 1997). 
Dairy farmers may be utilizing the MILC program, other government programs, and off-farm 
employment to stabilize their annual earnings.  
Significant evidence of this effect may also be seen with regards to the impact of the 
organic certification cost share subsidy on MILC participation. We find significant evidence that 
those participating in the organic program are more likely to participate in the MILC program. 
This program reimburses the dairy farm for up to 75% of the organic certification cost, thereby 
smoothing the cash flows of the farm business. Again, the income stabilization benefits of the 
program are increasing the likelihood of participation. It may also be the case that a dairy farmer 
who is already familiar and participating in one government program may be more willing to 
participate in another out of proximity. Similarly, farmers that are more aware of their financial 
situation are also more likely to participate in the MILC program. The marginal effect for the 
Record variable (0.615) is highly significant and shows the positive relationship between 
financial awareness and MILC participation.  
We also find significant evidence that medium sized farms are more likely to participate 
in the MILC program. Medium sized farms in our sample are those with a cowherd of 100 to 299 
cows. From Brown et al. (2010), the U.S. average cowherd equating to 2.985 million pounds of 13 
 
milk is 148. This average “critical herd size” falls squarely in the middle of the interval defined 
as medium farms. Our results indicate that farms operating within the neighborhood of the 
production limit for MILC participation are more likely to enter the MILC program. Linear and 
squared terms for the number of cows were included in the farm production equation as well. 
The results show that production is increasing with the number of cows but at a decreasing rate. 
We also found significant evidence that organic farms produced fewer pounds of milk. 
Considering 84% of the organic farms in our sample were also classified as small farms (fewer 
than 100 cows) lower levels of milk production are expected.     
In addition to herd size, M_Freq was found positively correlated with milk production. 
The marginal effect (10,042.07) was highly significant and indicates that more frequent daily 
milking results in greater production levels. Technologies like computerized data collection and 
internet access were, surprisingly, found negatively correlated with milk production. Perhaps the 
time and resources diverted to these technologies come at the expense of time dedicated to milk 
production. There may also be some interaction effect between adopters of these technologies 
and organic farming thereby leading to use by smaller farmers. The linear and squared cost 
measures for both labor and feed were both found positive and significantly correlated with milk 
production. This indicates that costs are increasing at an increasing rate with higher levels of 
milk production.  
Operator characteristics, like age and education, were found to be important determinants 
of MILC participation and farm production. Specifically, the marginal effects of Op_Educ_C and 
Op_Educ_H on MILC participation are 0.444 and 0.532 (both significant at 1%). More educated 
farmers were found more likely to participate in the MILC program than those without a high 
school education. The education obtained through additional years of school may help them 14 
 
understand the full benefit of the program and how to maximize the benefits to the farm. There 
also may be a connection between risk aversion and level of schooling leading to greater 
participation in the MILC program.   
Operator education had no effect on the quantity of milk produced, but age did have a 
negative and significant impact. An additional year in age resulted in 125.873 fewer pounds of 
milk produced. This effect can be explained in large part by differences in milking frequency 
across age groups. In our sample, the average age of farmers milking four times per day is 41.4 
years, three times per day is 51.2 years, two times per day is 51.5 years, and one time per day is 
56.7 years.  There is a 15.3 year gap between the average ages of the dairy farmers milking four 
times and once per day; therefore, production will be expected to decline as the farmer ages and 
thereby milks fewer times per day. Finally, we account for the region of the U.S. in which the 
farm is located. The Atlantic, Western, Mid-Western, and Plains regions were all found to 
produce greater amounts of milk than the Southern region. With regards to the MILC 
participation, there was no effect of region on the probability of farms participating. The constant 
in both equations were found negative and significant as well. 
Conclusion 
  This research finds provides valuable information on the causes of farmers entering the 
MILC program and the impacts on production of this decision. We find that more educated, 
organized, and financially concerned farmers who are currently participating in other 
government programs are more likely to enter the MILC program. Farm families desiring more 
stable income would track the financial performance of the farm, have the spouse engage in off-
farm work to earn more stable wages, and also participate in various government programs to 15 
 
stabilize farm income. These considerations were found to converge into a higher likelihood of 
entering the MILC program.  
  We found that as the predicted probability of MILC participation increases so does the 
amount of milk produced on the farm. This result is troubling if indeed MILC payments are 
sustaining inefficient smaller farms, leading to excess supply, downward pressure on milk prices, 
and thereby a higher likelihood of future MILC payments. In the coming Farm Bill debates, the 
outcries by larger dairy farmers and other opponents of the MILC program will become even 
louder if this is indeed the case.  
Alternatively, this effect may also be due to the timing of enrollment by farmers. Perhaps 
farmers that plan to enroll in the program do so early in the fiscal year and simply produce their 
desired quantity of milk regardless of the production limit. In this case, they are assured of 
receiving a stable payment on their first 2.985 million pounds of milk if prices fall below target. 
Farmers can the assume market risk or use other tools to hedge risk on the remaining output. 
More research needs to be done to discern which explanation is most plausible and look further 
at the timing of the enrollment decision. In any case, it appears the MILC program is effective at 
stabilizing the incomes of farm families and encouraging producers to continue operations.       
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Table 1: Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std Dev 
        Quantity of milk produced  70,373.4  144,347.
4 
MILC  1 if enrolled in MILC program; 0 otherwise  0.418  0.493 
M_Price  Price of milk received by farmer ($ per cwt)  16.632  3.446 
M_Freq  Number of times milked per day   2.156  0.375 
            Cost of hired labor ($)  129,989  311,577 
             Cost of taxes and insurance ($)  12,206  26,650 
           Cost of feed ($)  552,443  1,067,48 
              Cost of capital ($)  163,436  331,898 
Op_Age  Age of farm operator  51.476  11.200 
Off_Income_Op  Income earned from off-farm labor of operator ($)  2,473  20,287 
Off_Income_Sp  Income earned from off-farm labor of spouse ($)  8,666  17,178 
Op_Educ_C  College education and beyond  0.212  0.409 
Op_Educ_H  High school education and some college  0.609  0.488 
Op_Educ_B  Less than high school education  0.179  0.384 
        Number of Cows  329     622 
Small  1 if less than 100 cows; 0 otherwise  0.438  0.496 
Medium  1 if there are 100 or more cows but less than 300; 0 
otherwise  0.289  0.453 
Large  1 if 300 or more cows; 0 otherwise  0.273  0.446 
Record  1 if survey information derived from farm financial 
records; 0 otherwise  0.909  0.288 
Org_Cert  1 if received organic certification cost share subsidy; 0 
otherwise  0.044  0.206 
Organic  1 if farm produced certified organic milk in 2005; 0 
otherwise  0.194  0.396 
C_Milking  1 if using computerized data gathering during milking; 0 
otherwise  0.113  0.317 
M_Auto   1 if using milking units with automatic takeoffs; 0 
otherwise  0.544  0.498 
Internet  1 if access to internet; 0 otherwise  0.526  0.499 
Eligible  1 if below production and off-farm income 
requirements; 0 otherwise  0.583  0.493 
Atlantic  1 if farm in NASS Atlantic Region; 0 otherwise  0.355  0.479 
Western  1 if farm in NASS Western Region; 0 otherwise  0.183  0.386 
Midwest  1 if farm in NASS Midwest Region; 0 otherwise  0.357  0.479 
Plains  1 if farm in NASS Plains Region; 0 otherwise  0.047  0.211 
South  1 if farm in NASS South Region; 0 otherwise  0.058  0.234 20 
 
 Table 2: Marginal Effects from Two-Step Probit Least Squares Estimation of QMilk and MILC 
Farm Performance Equation (QMilk)  MILC Participation Equation (MILC) 
Variable 
Marginal 




Effect  Std Error 
   ̂       4,852.623*  2,651.124    ̂       -4.17E-07  6.97E-07 
           0.078***  0.010  Op_Age  0.002  0.003 
             0.036  0.076  Op_Educ_C  0.444***  0.108 
            0.026***  0.005  Op_Educ_H  0.532***  0.090 
              -0.008  0.007  Org_Cert  0.858***  0.165 
         
    0.000***  0.000  Small  0.183  0.158 
          
     0.000  0.000  Medium  0.217*  0.121 
        
     0.000***  0.000  M_Price  -0.034***  0.011 
           
      0.000  0.000  Record  0.615***  0.120 
        157.673***  7.871  Off_Income_Op  -3.21E-06  3.36E-06 
     
     -0.007***  0.001  Off_Income_Sp  4.33E-06**  1.82E-06 
Op_Age  -125.321*  65.311  Eligible   -0.083  0.114 
Op_Educ_C  296.269  2,688.759  Atlantic  0.137  0.148 
Op_Educ_H  -3,182.851  2,438.830  Western  0.178  0.157 
M_Freq  10,042.070***  2,384.258  Midwest  0.190  0.148 
M_Auto  -1,150.982  1,665.804  Plains  0.158  0.196 
C_Milking  -4,643.685*  2,576.884  Constant  -1.042***  0.324 
Internet  -4,073.111**  1,672.100 
N = 1732 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Marginal Effects Evaluated at Means 
Dependent Variable in Parentheses 
  ̂ denotes predicted values of dependent variables 
Organic  -3,920.531**  1,944.096 
Atlantic  15,671.880***  3,344.464 
Western   14,440.630***  3,611.528 
Midwest  18,496.060***  3,392.613 
Plains  10,837.060**  4,531.293 
Constant  -28,181.470***  7,161.866 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 